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Abstract
Economic theory suggests that performance pay may serve as an effective screening device
to attract productive agents. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely
limited to job tasks where performance is driven by routine, well-defined procedures.
This study presents evidence for a creative task and studies how agents self-select into
a tournament-based scheme vs. a fixed pay scheme. The experiment allows for the
measurement of creative productivity, risk preferences, self-assessments, gender, and other
socio-economic characteristics such as the Big Five personality traits. Results show that the
two payment schemes systematically attract agents with different characteristics. However,
results differ fundamentally from previously found patterns. Agents did not self-select
into the tournament scheme according to their creative productivity, but only according to
their risk attitudes and self-assessments. The reason for the absence of a selection of the
most creative agents into the tournament is that there exist substantial misjudgments of
relative creative productivity. Further evidence from a representative German survey data
set provides additional support for the experimental results suggesting external validity.
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1 Introduction
As organizations usually cannot perfectly observe the ability of agents during the hiring process,
principal agent theory suggests that performance-based compensation schemes can be used as
a screening device to attract high ability types (Stiglitz, 1975; Prendergast, 1999). Assume a
performance-based pay scheme which offers high ability types the opportunity to earn more
while low ability types are subject to earning less than under an alternative fixed pay scheme.
If agents can self-assess their ability accurately, they will self-select into the pay scheme which
maximizes their expected utility, i.e., high ability types would prefer the performance-based pay
and low ability types the fixed pay contract. Several empirical studies confirm that performance
pay, for instance in the form of tournament bonuses or piece rate contracts, induces a substantial
self-selection of relatively productive agents (see, for instance, Lazear, 2000; Banker et al.,
2000; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). However, the existing evidence on self-selection into pay for
performance is largely limited to tasks which are well-defined routine tasks such as installing
windshields in cars (Lazear, 2000), selling products (Banker et al., 2000), or solving simple
multiplication problems (Dohmen and Falk, 2011).
This paper investigates whether the finding that more productive agents sort into a
tournament-based pay scheme (vs. a fixed pay scheme), as shown in Dohmen and Falk (2011),
generalizes to a creative task. This research question is important because (1) the share of jobs
which require creative thinking is strongly increasing (Florida, 2004), and (2) creative tasks
may fundamentally differ from routine tasks with respect to an individual’s ability to self-assess
their own (relative) productivity (Dunning et al., 2004), which is an important requirement for
an individual’s self-selection in a compensation scheme. The present study observes people’s
self-assessments on (relative) performance in a creative task, and investigates how these affect
people’s sorting in a pay for performance scheme.
Moreover, pay for performance has been argued to be detrimental to creative performance by
crowding-out intrinsic motivation (for an overview see, for instance, Amabile, 1996a; Deci
et al., 1999).1 If highly intrinsically motivated agents anticipate such an effect, they should be
less likely to self-select into a pay for performance scheme (vs. a fixed wage alternative). The
study can shed light on the question of whether highly intrinsically motivated agents are more
or less likely to sort into pay for performance (vs. a fixed wage) in a creative task.
1Several psychological theories offer explanations for why individuals’ creativity may suffer if exposed to
external motivators. According to self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), a reward causes a shift in people’s
perception about why they perform a task: own behavior is attributed to the reward and not to the enjoyment of the
activity itself (Deci, 1972; Lepper et al., 1973). Another prominent approach posits that the implementation of a
reward for creative tasks can be perceived as controlling, reducing perceived autonomy and feelings of competence.
This, in turn, lowers people’s intrinsic task interest and finally creative output (Amabile, 1983; Deci and Ryan,
1985; Hennessey and Amabile, 1988).
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During the last decades, technological change gave rise to a considerable shift from routine
tasks to non-routine tasks where an important share of the latter demand problem-solving
capability and creativity.2 In the US, 20 million new jobs were added between 1985 and
2005 in the creative economy which goes beyond sectors such as arts, design, culture or
entertainment as it also refers to all research-oriented and knowledge intense professions
(Florida, 2006). As globalization and digitization of markets accelerates the competition for
innovations, organizations rely on creative talents (Company, 2013) who are able to generate
valuable ideas as important drivers for innovations.3
One possibility for firms to attract creative talents is to offer incentives for high creative
performance. In fact, performance pay is similarly widespread in the creative as in the
non-creative sector.4 However, in the creative sector performance is typically difficult to
measure and depends on subjective evaluations. That is why creative performance is often
aligned to relative performance. For instance, if firms face the question of which design to
choose, which marketing strategy to follow or which new product to develop, it is much easier
to use a tournament-based bonus to reward the employee with the best creative output rather
than to evaluate creative output in absolute terms.5
An important requirement for individuals’ self-selection into a tournament-based pay scheme
is their ability to adequately self-assess their relative productivity. Dohmen and Falk (2011)
observe that agents have a good knowledge of their relative productivity in a simple math task.
Here, agents were sorted into a tournament-based pay scheme (vs. fixed pay scheme) efficiently,
in the sense that the more productive agents chose the tournament while the less productive
agents self-selected into the fixed pay. Several reasons exist to explain why self-assessments
are likely to be accurate in routine tasks such as finding the solution of simple math equations.
Routine tasks can be solved according to clearly-defined procedures. Quantity is typically easy
to observe and quality of output is well measurable as unique solutions exist. The availability of
these objective performance measures allows individuals to observe their relative performance
2Routine tasks typically follow clearly defined procedures and can also be executed by a machine or computer.
Non-routine manual tasks demand workers’ physical capabilities, visual recognition, and communication while
non-routine cognitive tasks may require problem-solving or creativity. The latter are typical in professional,
managerial, technical and creative occupations and cannot be accomplished by computers (Autor et al., 2003;
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
3“[...], creativity is simply the production of novel, appropriate ideas in any realm of human activity, from
science, to arts, to education, to business, to everyday life. [...] Creativity is the first step in innovation, which is
the successful implementation of those novel, appropriate ideas.” (Amabile, 1997, p. 40).
4Lemieux et al. (2009), for instance, shows that performance-based pay schemes are generally observed across
all industry sectors and for all occupational types. Own analyses with a large German data set indicate that about
a quarter of all employees in the creative as well as in the non-creative sector earn a monthly wage or yearly bonus
that is performance-based. See Section 5 for details.
5Lazear and Rosen (1981) already argued that it is less costly to rank employees if absolute performance is
difficult to measure. Even if it is possible to align bonuses to sales, tournaments might be favorable to absolute
performance evaluations to assure employees against common shocks on the market.
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in a transparent way. In contrast, an established literature in psychological science reports
that self-assessments are much more likely to reveal substantial biases in tasks which are more
complex or non-routine (see, e.g., Dunning et al., 2004 and references therein).6 Within the
range of more complex or non-routine tasks, creative tasks have specific features which make
them particularly prone to misjudgments in relative self-assessments. First, no well-defined
procedure exists how to generate an extraordinary idea. As a consequence, it can hardly be
trained to be creative. For instance, researchers may acquire theoretical knowledge as well as
practical abilities during their educational career which help them to conduct research, but no
guideline exists which they can follow in order to identify a great research idea or to make
a ground-breaking invention. Second, objective standards are often missing and information
on alternative solutions are not available. Therefore, evaluations remain highly subjective and
feedback is more ambiguous. This can cause an “error of omission” (see Dunning et al., 2004,
and references therein). That is, people tend to ignore available information from feedback
and adhere to their own self-perception. The question of whether people rather overestimate
or underestimate their own performance has been found to depend on the perception of task
difficulty. People view themselves as above average performer in domains which are viewed
as easy (although they are complex), such as driving a car; and in contrast, the bias in
self-assessments reverses if people view the domain as difficult (Kruger, 1999; Moore and
Small, 2007). In a creative task, it remains an open question as to whether people rather tend
to under- or to overestimate their relative ability in a way which hinders pay for performance
schemes to attract the most creative talents. The present study will shed light on this question.
This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment and complementary evidence from
a German representative field data set on agents’ self-selection into performance pay. A
laboratory experiment offers the possibility to study the causal impact of creative performance,
self-assessments, risk attitudes, and other individual characteristics on an agentŠs sorting
decision into a tournament scheme vs. a fixed-pay scheme. The structure of the experimental
design is aligned to the study by Dohmen and Falk (2011) to directly compare results to a
routine task. In order to observe individuals’ creativity, subjects were asked to perform a task
called “unusual uses” which is known as an established creativity test. Specifically, it measures
divergent thinking and has been demonstrated to consistently predict who will produce novel
and useful ideas (Batey and Furnham, 2006; Guilford, 1959, 1967). In the unusual uses task,
6Most evidence on self-assessments in the work context did not explicitly focus on creative tasks but on complex
tasks such as in managerial and professional jobs which comprise also creative jobs. Evidence by Stajkovic and
Luthans (1998), for instance, shows that the correlation between how people expect to perform and how they
actually perform in the workplace is weak in tasks which can be defined as rather complex, that is, tasks which
require a combination of different skills, such as knowledge, cognitive ability, memory capacity, behavioral facility,
information processing, persistence, and physical effort (Bandura, 1986). Similarly, a meta-analysis by Harris and
Schaubroeck (1988) found that the relationship between self-ratings of employees’ and ratings of their supervisors
were particularly low when tasks were less well-defined managerial or professional jobs than blue-collar or service
jobs.
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subjects are requested to think of as many, as different and as original uses of an ordinary object,
such as a tin can. The creativity score is composed of largely objective evaluation criteria, such
as the number of responses, the variety in responses and the relative frequency of a response
as a measure for originality. After the creative output was measured in the first part of the
experiment, subjects were asked to choose their preferred reward scheme for the next unusual
uses task (with a different unknown object). They could either opt for a tournament where they
could win a large tournament prize or nothing, or they could choose a fixed payment which
was substantially smaller than the tournament prize. During the experiment, self-assessments
as well as self-reports on perceived fun, effort, stress, and exhaustion were elicited. Further,
risk preferences and other personality measures, such as the Big Five personality traits, were
measured at the end of the experiment. Thus, similar to Dohmen and Falk (2011), the design
allows to study multidimensional sorting with respect to a comprehensive set of personal
characteristics.
Results show that the two different compensation schemes systematically attract different types
of agents. In line with previous evidence, the results reveal that the more risk tolerant agents
are and the more optimistically they self-assess their relative ability, the more likely they are
to opt for the tournament. However, in contrast to previously observed sorting patterns in
routine tasks, I do not find that the more productive agents in the creative task self-selected
into the tournament. It can be shown that substantial misjudgments in agents self-assessments
can explain why the pay for performance scheme does not attract the high ability types. Many
agents hold wrong beliefs about their relative ability in the creative task. The specific features of
creative tasks are likely candidates to explain these substantial flaws in self-assessments. There
is no evidence of a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation that could explain the results.
The opposite is true in the sense that agents who indicate a relatively high level of enjoyment
during the task are more likely to opt for the tournament. However, enjoyment during the task as
an indicator for intrinsic motivation is only weakly related to creative performance. Moreover,
it can be shown that the absence of sorting according to creative ability cannot be explained by
the fact that agents may perceive creative output as more risky.
Finally, I present complementary evidence from a German field data set which supports the
results from the experiment. Here, I use information on the Big Five personality trait openness
which is an established predictor for creativity (for instance, McCrae, 1987). Results show that
people with a relatively high score in openness are more likely to work in the creative sector,
however, they are not more likely to be found in a job with performance pay within the creative
sector.
The findings of the study have important implications for HR managers and inform
decision-makers which types of workers they may or may not attract with a tournament-based
compensation scheme in jobs that rely heavily on creative performance.
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The paper is structured as follows: the next section gives an overview on the related literature.
Section 3 introduces the creative task and the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results
of the experiment and Section 5 provides additional evidence from an analysis with field data
to check the external validity of the experimental findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A myriad of studies deal with the effects of performance pay in general, and tournaments in
particular. However, these studies predominantly investigated the incentive effects on work
performance (for an overview see, e.g., Bonner et al., 2000; Gneezy et al., 2011). So far, only
a limited number of empirical studies looked at the effects of self-selection into performance
pay schemes. Most of the previous evidence on sorting in performance pay schemes is based
on absolute performance measures such as piece rate contracts. For instance, Lazear (2000)
reports large productivity gains in a firm which replaced fixed wages with a linear piece rate
scheme. He finds that a substantial share of the productivity gain goes beyond an incentive
effect and can be attributed to the fact that relatively productive agents systematically selected
themselves in the firm while less productive agents were more likely to leave the firm. Similar
sorting patterns of the more able workers into bonus contracts with absolute performance goals
have been shown by Banker et al. (2000). Further, Eriksson and Villeval (2008) and Cadsby
et al. (2007) provide experimental evidence demonstrating that relatively productive agents are
more likely to choose a piece rate vs. a fixed wage scheme compared to less productive agents.
More recently, Dohmen and Falk (2011) extended the evidence by conducting an experiment
where they study sorting in performance pay for piece rates, revenue sharing contracts, and
tournaments. As in previous studies, they confirmed that the most productive workers are
significantly more likely to sort into each of these variable pay schemes while less productive
workers were more likely to choose a fixed pay alternative. Dohmen and Falk (2011)
further investigate multidimensional sorting and study how other factors such as agents’ risk
preferences, self-confidence, and personal characteristics affect the sorting decision. They
find that agents who are relatively risk tolerant and self-confident with respect to their
relative performance were more likely to self-select into performance pay. Economic theory
predicts that risk-aversion is a constraining factor for the provision of incentives in firms
(see Prendergast, 2000 and references therein). Empirical evidence supports theory and
demonstrates that variable pay schemes attract significantly more risk tolerant agents (e.g.,
see Eriksson et al., 2009; Grund and Sliwka, 2010; Bellemare and Shearer, 2010; Cornelissen
et al., 2011). In addition, it has also been shown that performance-contingent pay schemes are
typically observed with higher average pay levels to compensate workers for the risk induced
by the larger variability in earnings (Grund and Sliwka, 2010). For organizations, the selection
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of relatively risk tolerant agents can be beneficial, for instance, when investments in new risky
strategies or technologies are desirable.
A comprehensive literature on gender differences in preferences reports that women are more
risk and competitiveness averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) which has been related to the fact
that women are less likely to sort into variable pay schemes. In the study by Dohmen and Falk
(2011), women preferred significantly more often a fixed payment over a variable pay scheme
compared to men, which was mainly explained by their risk aversion. Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) let subjects choose between a piece rate and a tournament and find that women shy away
from competition by opting for the piece rate significantly more often than men.
Moreover, social preferences can be a relevant sorting dimension for firms to increase
cooperation within the organization and to avoid free-riding in teams (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2002; Kosfeld and von Siemens, 2011). However, Dohmen and Falk (2011) found that neither
trust nor reciprocity determined the sorting decision into a tournament vs. a fixed pay contract
in their study.
Finally, an experiment by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) shows that sorting into a tournament
with performance pay is significantly affected by overconfidence of subjects.7 In a knowledge
quiz task, subjects overestimated their relative ability and entered a tournament more frequently
compared to a condition where payoffs depend on a chance device. Based on this finding,
they argue that agents who compete based on skills are insufficiently sensitive to the quality of
competition and reveal a “reference group neglect”.
Overall, the evidence suggests that agents’ self-selection with respect to productivity and other
individual characteristics fundamentally affects the composition of a firm’s workforce.
3 Experimental Approach and Design
Several reasons exist why a laboratory experiment is an ideal way to study agents’ sorting
into particular compensation schemes. In practice, important sorting factors such as
individuals’ ability, risk attitudes, self-perception of own (relative) productivity or other
personal characteristics are rarely observable. Even if information on these factors is available,
7More evidence for the effect of overconfidence on contract selection exists for non-competitive piece rate and
bonus contracts. For instance, in Larkin and Leider (2012) subjects performed in simple multiplication problems
and trivia questions. They find that substantial share of subjects is overconfident and self-select into a convex
piece rate scheme although the alternative of a linear piece rate scheme would have been payoff maximizing
for them. Hyatt and Taylor (2008) show that incomplete knowledge about personal capabilities lead subjects
to overestimate their absolute performance. In their study, many subjects opted for a contract which assigns a
bonus for exceeding a fixed performance standard although their payoff would have been maximized by a fixed
pay alternative. Only when participants learned about their actual performance capabilities by receiving absolute
feedback before choosing the contract, low performers favored the fixed pay contract more often and increased
their earnings.
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it is very difficult to identify the causal impact of these factors on agents’ self-selection. The
implementation of specific HR practices, such as a new compensation scheme, is not exogenous
and confounding factors may mislead causal inferences. Moreover, it will take some time until
the endogenous composition of the workforce changes due to the implementation of a new
compensation scheme. A lot of things may happen in between which simultaneously affect
who is going to enter and who is going to leave the organization. This time delay renders
infeasible a clear-cut distinction between the mere effect of the change in the compensation
scheme on the workforce composition and the impact of other factors.
3.1 The Creative Task
In the experiment, subjects were asked to perform on a “real effort” task which requires
creativity. The task is called “unusual uses task” and adopted from established creativity tests.
Originally introduced by the Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task (Guilford, 1967), it was later
on also integrated in the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1968, 1998), which is
known as the most widely used test to assess an individual’s capacity for creativity, and its
validity has been confirmed in a large number of studies (Sternberg, 1999; Kim, 2006).8 An
example of the task is as follows: “Please list as many, as different and as unusual uses of a tin
can as you can think of! Do not restrict yourself to a specific size or shape. You can also think
of uses which require several tin cans. Do not limit yourself to uses which you know but think
of as many unusual uses as possible!”.
This task captures an essential aspect of many research-oriented and knowledge-intense
professions: recombining existing bits of knowledge in novel ways (Burt, 2004; Simonton,
2004). It requires divergent thinking, also known as the the ability “to think out-of-the-box”,
what is seen as one of the most important components of the creative process (Runco, 1991). It
is suitable to be implemented in the laboratory as it does not require previous knowledge and
both the task and the scoring procedure are easy to understand.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects received detailed instructions about the task and
how it would be scored. Before the experiment started, subjects could test the task for one
minute. In this test period, they were asked to think of unusual uses for the item “old tire” to
familiarize themselves with the task.
During the experiment, subjects worked on the three items (paper, cord, tin can) in separate
steps of the experiment. Subjects are allowed to work for three minutes on each item. Previous
evidence by Bradler et al. (2014) shows that subjects who worked on the identical items
8While the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking aims to assess the overall creative potential of a person and
comprises several figural and verbal elements, the unusual uses task captures the type of creativity which is the
most relevant for the non-routine, knowledge intense jobs of the creative class.
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sequentially with a working time of three minutes yield scores that are highly and significantly
correlated across the items without an indication of significant learning or fatigue effects.9
Research assistants evaluated responses immediately after the working time of 3 minutes and
subjects received feedback according to their achieved total points. Subjects’ responses to the
unusual uses task are evaluated according to three criteria: validity, flexibility, and originality
(Guilford, 1959; Torrance, 1968).10 Validity refers to the number of valid answers of “unusual
uses” which are rather leniently defined as any relevant use other than a usual use. In the case
of a tin can, the usual use is defined as a container for preserving food or other products which
are typically sold in tin cans such as paint. Other responses describing the use of an empty tin
can to store things, such as coins or pens, are counted. Moreover, an answer is valid if the stated
use is possible to implement, the respective item remains the main component of the new use
and the implementation of the new use does not require further essential components other than
simple resources which are typically available in an average household. Fantastic or impossible
uses beyond all possible reality are not counted. Examples for a valid use of a tin can are, for
instance, a flower pot, a football, or a drum. In contrast, examples of invalid answers are a
television, a computer, or a plane (unless specified as a toy). The validity score is determined
by counting one point for each valid unusual use.
The second evaluation criteria is the flexibility score. It reflects the variety of responses of a
subject and is determined by counting the number of different categories into which responses
fall. Assume a subject gives the responses: candle holder, a baking-tin, a rattle, and a drum. The
candle holder falls into the category decoration; the baking-tin falls into the category molds,
and both the rattle and the drum are music instruments. That is, three different categories
are mentioned. For each category, the participant receives one point resulting in a score of 3
flexibility points. Examples of frequently scored categories are “non-food containers” (e.g.,
pen container), “sport devices” (e.g., a football) or “toys” (e.g., pot hitting). The classification
of categories is adopted from another experiment reported in Bradler et al. (2014). The latter
tested about 600 subjects for the items tin can, paper and cord and developed a comprehensive
catalog of responses and categories in which responses fall.11 This comprehensive catalog of
answers also gives precise information on how often particular answers are given.
This information is required for the third evaluation criteria: the originality of answers which is
9For instance, the correlation between subjects’ scores for the item paper and tin can was 0.71, between paper
and cord 0.72, and between tin can and cord 0.77.
10The original scoring procedures also use a fourth criterion, elaboration, which refers to the detailedness of the
answers. This dimension is not used here to avoid that subjects spend too much time on very detailed answers,
which would have made difficult a quick scoring of answers within the time frame of the experiment at risk.
11The Torrance Test of Creative Thinking offers an evaluation manual for the item tin can which was mainly
developed with answers from people at relatively young age and restricted to English. Bradler et al. (2014) created
a catalog of answers in German language and for the additional items cord and paper. Aligned to the original
scoring manual for the tin can, approximately 55 categories were classified for each of the items.
8
measured by the statistical infrequency of an answer. All valid responses of previously tested
subjects were tabulated according to their frequency and a rating scale to assess originality
points was constructed. This scale allots one point to an answer if it is given by less than 5%
of the test subjects (“original”) and two points to answers that were given by less than 1% of
the test subjects (“very original”). Table 1 provides examples of frequent answers, categories
as well as (very) original and invalid answers for all three items. In order to calculate the total
score in the unusual uses task, the points for the separate dimensions validity, flexibility and
originality are summed up. The scoring was conducted by three research assistants, who were
carefully acquainted with the scoring procedures. In order to be able to evaluate the creative
output quickly, sessions were restricted to 10 subjects. After each work task of 3 minutes, it took
about 8-10 minutes to evaluate all answers. Subjects were informed that they were not allowed
to use mobile phones or to read any private documents during these breaks. In comparison
to expert ratings as an alternative evaluation method, the statistical approach of the scoring
procedure in the unusual uses task substantially reduces the scope for subjectivity. Objective
evaluation rules minimize the potential problem that the evaluation is perceived as arbitrary or
unfair.
3.2 The Experimental Set-up
The aim of the experiment was (1) to observe how individual characteristics, and in particular
creative ability, affect the sorting decision into a tournament-based vs. fixed pay scheme in a
creative task and (2) to be able to compare results with previous findings by Dohmen and Falk
(2011) who studied the latter for a simple math task. For this reason, the experimental design
was largely adopted from Dohmen and Falk (2011). In total, subjects went through 11 steps in
the experiment. Figure 1 gives an overview of all steps in the experimental design. The first five
steps of the experiment were set up to measure individual creative ability and to provide subjects
with feedback on their performance followed by some questions related to subjects’ effort and
self-assessment. Creative ability was approximated by subjects’ productivity in the unusual
uses task performed under two different conditions: with and without a monetary reward for
performance. According to standard economic theory, subjects should increase effort until the
marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of providing one additional unit of output. Thus, a
linear payment per unit of output (a piece rate) should elicit a good proxy for individuals relative
ability measured by their productivity. This may not hold for creative tasks if a crowding-out of
intrinsic motivation occurs. Creative tasks have been found to involve a high level of intrinsic
motivation relative to routine tasks (Amabile, 1996a), and therefore creative output may be
relatively affected by financial rewards. This has empirically been observed in particular when
a reward is perceived as controlling and decrease people feelings of self-determination (Deci
et al., 1999). In contrast, when the informational value of a reward outweighs the controlling
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effects, feelings of self-determination are not necessarily reduced but can also increase and lead
to better creative performance (Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Eisenberger and Shanock,
2003). In economics, crowding-out effects have so far been studied mainly in the context of
intrinsically motivated activities other than creative tasks (see Frey and Jegen, 2001, for an
overview) and the existence of crowding-out effects is controversially debated (for instance,
Fang and Gerhart, 2012; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Charness and
Grieco, 2013). In order to check for potential crowding-out effects of the piece rate incentive,
individual productivity is measured (1) without reward and (2) under a piece rate incentive.
In the following, I describe each step in more detail. The experiment started after subjects
were instructed about the task and scoring procedure and the exercise period of one minute was
completed. In step 1, each subject was asked to work on the unusual uses task with the item
“paper”. In this first task, no payment was announced. In the following, subjects’ score in step
1 will be referred to as “Productivity Indicator 1”. As the performance in the first task was not
rewarded, the Productivity Indicator 1 can be interpreted as a measure of intrinsic motivation
and ability in the task.
After the task, subjects’ responses were scored as described in Section 3.1. Before feedback
on scores was given, subjects were asked for a self-assessment of their absolute score in task 1
(step 2). In particular, subjects should indicate: “What do you think, how did you score in the
previous task? (Please enter your guess for the total number of points for validity, flexibility
and originality.)”.12 This step represents an additional stage to the design of Dohmen and Falk
(2011) and was implemented to measure how subjects self-assess their absolute performance
before they receive any feedback on their actual score.
In step 3, subjects were informed about their actual total score and the following four questions
were posed to elicit subjects perceived fun with the task and how hard they worked during the
3-minute working time: (1) “How much fun did you have during the task?” (2) “How much
effort did you exert?” (3) “How stressed did you feel?” (4) “How exhausted did you get?”.
Answers were given on a seven-point Likert scale, where the value 1 refers to “not at all” and
the value of 7 to “‘very much”. Questions 2 to 4 were adopted by Dohmen and Falk (2011),
question 1 was added as an indicator of intrinsic motivation.13
In step 4, subjects were asked to work on a second creative task. Before the task started, subjects
were informed on the computer screen that they will face the same task as before but a different
item, and this time they are paid a linear payment depending on their total score. Each point
of their total score will be remunerated with 10 Taler (which was worth 0.20 Euros). The item
12Subjects were informed that they will receive a monetary bonus of 100 Taler if the answer is correct with a
deviation of +/- 5 points.
13“Intrinsic motivation has been defined as performing behaviors out of interest, pleasure, and enjoyment.”
(Waterman, 2005, p.1). People’s reports of how interesting and enjoyable they find the activity is an established
measure of their intrinsic motivation (Vansteenkiste and Deci, 2003).
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which each subject was given in the second task was a “cord”. In the following, subjects’ score
in step 4 will be referred to as “Productivity Indicator 2”.
In step 5, subjects were asked again to subjectively assess the fun with the task and how
hard they worked, identical to step 3. Subsequently, subjects were requested to indicate
a self-assessment of their relative performance in the previous task by asking: “What do
you think, how many of the 9 other participants achieved more points than you did?”.14
Relative self-assessment will reveal whether subjects have a good knowledge about their relative
performance which is an important factor for people’s sorting decision. A comparison of
subjects’ true rank and their rank belief will reveal if subjects show an over- or underconfidence
with respect to their creative productivity. The subjects received no information about their true
rank in the distribution before the very end of the experiment.
In step 6, the subjects were informed that they have again the possibility to work for 3 minutes
on the same task as before, but now they would be able to choose between two alternative
compensation schemes. One compensation scheme was a fixed payment. In case the fixed
payment was chosen, subjects would be guaranteed a payment of 400 Taler independent of
their score.
wFi = 400. (1)
The other compensation scheme was a tournament for a monetary prize. In case the tournament
contract was chosen, a subject i competed against a randomly chosen opponent j, who had also
opted for the tournament. Within this two-person tournament, the subject who achieved a higher
score in the working period of 3 minutes won the tournament. The winner received a prize, γ,
of 1300 Taler; the loser received 0 Taler. The wage of the tournament contract wT of subject i
can be written as follows:
wTi =

1, 300 if xi > xj, i 6= j;
1, 300 with probability 0.5 and 0 with probability 0.5 if xi = xj;
0 otherwise
Further details of the implementation were designed to mirror that of Dohmen and Falk
(2011).15
14As in step 2, subjects received a monetary incentive to make their best guess. They received 100 Taler if the
number was correct, 50 Taler for a deviation of +/- 1 from the correct number, and 0 Taler otherwise.
15Subjects were informed that in case of a tie, the winner would be determined by a random draw. If only one
subject opted for the tournament (which did not happen), the subject was informed that the tournament could not
take place and that the compensation would be the fixed payment of 400 Taler. In case of an odd number of subjects
who opted for the tournament, the score of a randomly drawn subject was used a second time and assigned as an
opponent for this unmatched subject.
11
Based on the framework in Lazear and Rosen (1981), the sorting decision can be briefly
illustrated as follows. Assume an individual’s output xi depends on his productivity pii, which
is a function of effort ei and ability θi: xi = pi(θi, ei) + i where i∼N(0, σ2 ), piθ, pie > 0 and
pieθ ≥ 0. Further, the utility of subject i is described by u(w,e) = w - c(e), where w denotes the
wage w and c the subject’s costs which are a function of the given effort level e, with uw > 0,
and uc < 0 since ce > 0. A utility-maximizing subject should opt for the tournament if the
subject’s expected utility of the tournament exceeds the subject’s utility of the fixed pay. That
is, a risk neutral subject optimally participates in the tournament if the tournament wage, wTi ,
multiplied by its probability minus its costs of effort exceeds the fixed wage, wFi , minus the
subject’s costs of a minimum effort provision, c(emin), which can be interpreted as the costs of
remaining in the lab:
wTi · Prob
{
pii(θi, e
∗
i )− pij(θj, e∗j) > j − i
}− c(e∗i ) ≥ wFi − c(emin).
The probability of winning the tournament is determined by the difference in the productivity
between subject i and subject j, which depends on their respective abilities, θi and θj , and the
optimal effort levels, e∗i and e
∗
j compared to the difference in the random components j and i,
which can be interpreted as luck.16
Because of the fact that the creative task is an established and validated creativity test, the
difference in ability, ∆θij = θi − θj , is likely to dominate luck in determining output, and thus
the winner of the tournament. Thus, if subjects have a sufficient knowledge about their relative
ability, one can expect a sorting pattern where more able (creative) subjects are more likely to
sort into the tournament while less able (creative) subjects opt for the fixed wage. However,
due to the specific attributes of the creative task, which I discussed in the introduction, subjects
may not assess their own ability relative to the ability of the other subject correctly. Subject’s
belief on the difference in ability, ∆θˆij = θˆi − θˆj , might be optimistic with ∆θˆij > ∆θij ,
or pessimistic with ∆θˆij < ∆θij . An optimistic (or pessimistic) subject might still prefer
the option which would have been favored with a correct assessment of own relative ability.
However, subjects may be overly optimistic (or pessimistic) so that they favor the tournament
(the fixed pay) when a correct assessment of own relative ability would not have led to the same
decision. That is, misjudgments may render subjects less likely to sort into the tournament
according to their true relative ability in the creative task.
16As Dohmen and Falk (2011) already noted, there is not necessarily a unique sorting threshold as this depends
on various distributional assumptions. For instance, in the absence of luck, a more able subject always wins
the tournament against a less able subject. In this case, no tournament would take place as only the most able
subject would opt for the tournament. In contrast, if, for instance, both agents have the same ability, luck becomes
the decisive factor and everybody should opt for the tournament (in case of risk neutral agents). However, it is
plausible to assume that a sorting equilibrium exists for intermediate cases where subjects opt for the tournament
if their ability exceeds a certain threshold and less able subjects sort into the fixed payment.
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In step 7, immediately after opting for one of the two payment schemes but before the working
time started, the subject faced a series of hypothetical sorting decisions. Here, subjects
were asked which scheme they would have picked if the fixed payment had been different.
More precisely, subjects who preferred the tournament could decide whether they still would
have preferred the tournament over a fixed payment of {450, 500, ..., 800}. If the fixed
payment was preferred in the actual sorting decision, subjects should indicate whether they
still would have decided against the tournament in case of a fixed payment of {50, 100, ...350}.
These hypothetical sorting decisions reveal how strong subjects’ preferences for the respective
payment schemes are.
Subsequently, the actual working period of 3 minutes started in step 8 under the preferred pay
scheme. After the working time ended, the subject’s earnings were displayed on the screen,
and tournament participants were notified about their score and the score of their randomly
matched opponent. Identical to step 3 and 5, subjects are again asked to assess their fun with
the task and how hard they worked (step 9). The final two steps are designed to observe personal
characteristics.17
In step 10, risk preferences were elicited with simple lottery choices. Subjects faced a sequence
of 15 choices between a safe option and a lottery. The lottery was the same in each row
and offered 400 Taler with 0.5 probability and 0 Taler with 0.5 probability. The safe option
guaranteed a fixed amount of Taler and got increasingly attractive from row to row. In row 1,
for instance, the safe option was 25 Taler, in the second 50 Taler and so on up to 375 Taler as
alternative to the lottery. In order to determine subject’s payoff, one row was randomly chosen
to be relevant.18 In the final step 11, subjects received a questionnaire to gather information
on subjects’ socio-economic characteristics (such as gender, age, nationality and income), their
educational background and achievements (final school grade, major subjects in high school and
field of study at university), creative hobbies as well as the Big Five personality traits (Costa
and McCrae, 1992). The questionnaire further included an alternative measure for participants‘
risk attitudes. Like Dohmen and Falk (2011), I used the wording from the 2004 wave of the
German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP).19 Here, subjects are asked to indicate their
17In contrast to Dohmen and Falk (2011), I did not measure social preferences because the selection into
a tournament in their experiment was neither driven by subjects’ willingness to trust nor their inclination to
reciprocate. Also, Bradler et al. (2014) find that for subjects who were randomly selected into a tournament in
the unusual uses task neither reciprocal preferences in a gift-exchange game nor their revealed social preferences
in a sequence of simple distribution games showed a significant impact on subjects’ effort levels in the tournament.
18The fact that subjects already know their earnings from previous stages might cause an endowment effect and
bias subjects’ preferences in the lottery choices. Especially, the information on the assignment of the relatively
high tournament prize can be seen as critical to cause an endowment effect. In order to check for the validity of the
lottery risk measure., I additionally randomized the information structure across sessions: in half of the sessions
subjects who performed in the tournament learned their payoff immediately after the task, and in the other half
subjects were not informed about the outcome of the tournament until the very end of the experiment.
19The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a representative large-scale survey among the German
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willingness to take risks in general on an 11-point scale where zero means “not willing to take
risks at all” and 10 means “strongly willing to take risks”. The behavioral validity of this
survey measure was demonstrated by Dohmen et al. (2011) who compare responses for this
risk measure with behavior in paid real-stakes lotteries for a large representative sample. The
risk measure from the GSOEP proved a high predictive power for actual risk-taking behavior in
the financial domain, such as holding stocks, but was also the best all-around measure for risky
behavior across other contexts such as health, sports or labor market outcomes. In addition,
I elicited subjects’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivational orientation with the help of the Work
Preference Inventory (WPI) invented by Amabile et al. (1994).20
3.3 Procedural Details
The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
with students from the University of Heidelberg. Subjects were recruited using the online
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). At the very beginning of the experiment, subjects
were instructed that no aid was allowed to come up with creative ideas in the unusual uses task
(no mobile, no internet or any private documents). They were also informed about the basic
structure of the experiment and that all actions during the experiment were anonymous. Subjects
received a printed handout with an example of the unusual uses task and the scoring procedure.
The latter was explained with examples for the item “old tire”. Further instructions were shown
on the computer screen. In total, I ran 13 sessions, each with 10 invited participants. Thus,
overall 130 students participated in the experiment.21 A session lasted on average 90 minutes.
The exchange rate of the experimental currency “Taler” was 10 Taler = 0.20 Euros (1 Euro =
1.32 US Dollar at that time). Average earnings were 21.30 Euros.
population covering a broad range of topics.
20Amabile developed a measure to identify the motivational orientation type. The measure consists of 30
items describing personal attitudes and characteristics as for example: "To me, success means doing better than
other people." (see Amabile et al. (1994), p. 956). People are asked to agree or disagree to the statements on
4-point Likert scales. Finally, a score for the extrinsic and intrinsic motivational orientation can be constructed.
Extrinsically motivated types are assumed to be more responsive to financial incentives than intrinsically motivated
types. Therefore, the WPI measure gives the possibility of observing whether the tournament prize attracts people
with relatively high extrinsic motivation.
21Fluent German skills were announced as a prerequisite for participating in the experiment. Nevertheless, six
students had an insufficient knowledge of the German language, and thus, severe problems to understand the task.
Another subject did not press “Enter” after submitting responses, so that creativity ability could not be measured.
These seven participants were dropped for the analysis.
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4 Results
In the results section, I will first look at descriptive statistics on the creative productivity of
subjects before and after sorting. Subsequently, I will analyze how subjects sorted into their
preferred compensation scheme according to their creative productivity, self-assessments, risk
preferences, gender, and other personal characteristics.
4.1 Creative Productivity before Sorting
Individual productivity was measured in the first task of the experiment without any reward
(Productivity Indicator 1) and in the second task with the financial incentive induced by a piece
rate scheme (Productivity Indicator 2). On average subjects achieved a total score of 22.57
(s.d.=10.13) in the Productivity Indicator 1 and 27.07 (s.d.=10.26) in the Productivity Indicator
2.22
The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in a paired t-test. This suggests a
positive incentive effect of the piece rate on creative performance if the assumption holds that
subjects were not affected by learning effects. The latter is supported by the evidence of Bradler
et al. (2014) where subjects who performed the unusual uses task with identical items and work
duration did not show significant learning effects. Thus, there is no indication of a detrimental
effect of the piece rate on creative performance in the unusual uses task and the Productivity
Indicator 2 appears to be a good proxy for individual ability.23 Self-reports on perceived fun
on the task provide additional support against the notion of a potential crowding-out effect of
intrinsic motivation by the piece rate. If crowding-out occurred, one should see a decline in
perceived fun on the task under the piece rate compared to perceived fun on the task in the
absence of rewards. The opposite is true. Subjects’ indicated an average fun level of 3.53
(s.d.=0.13) after task 1 (no reward) and 4.00 (s.d.=0.14) after task 2 (rewarded by piece rate).
The difference is significant by a paired t-test (p=0.000) and demonstrates that the piece rate
22After completing the first creative task, subjects were asked in step 2 of the experiment to give a guess how
many points they achieved in the first task. On average, subjects underestimated their absolute score by 10.28
points (s.d.=14.85). This demonstrates that subjects had difficulties assessing their absolute performance. In order
to enable subjects to learn about their creative ability in absolute terms, subjects received feedback on their score
after task 1 and 2 before they faced the sorting decision. However, what finally determines whether a subject wins
or loses the tournament is relative performance.
23As described in the introduction, a financial reward for a creative task may reduce performance due to a
crowding-out of intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999; Frey and Jegen, 2001). However, previous psychological
literature argues that crowding-out effects are largely limited to rewards which are perceived as controlling
Deci et al. (2001) whereas an enhancing effect occurs if the latter instead strengthens subjects feeling of
self-determination (Eisenberger and Aselage, 2009; Eisenberger and Armeli, 1997; Eisenberger and Cameron,
1996).
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increased intrinsic motivation in the task.24 Moreover, a comparison of perceived stress after
task 1 and 2 reveals no significant change between both tasks.
In the following, I will mainly refer to Productivity Indicator 2 in the analyses, but robustness
checks reveal that all main results stay qualitatively similar if the Productivity Indicator 1 is
used instead.
The data gathered in the experiment also shed light on the relationship between creative
productivity and personal characteristics such as risk attitude, gender, age, the high school
grade or the Big Five personality traits. In line with comprehensive evidence in the literature
(for instance, Batey and Furnham, 2006), I find a substantial and significant correlation between
creative performance and intelligence where the latter is approximated by the final grade from
high school.25 Another significant and sizable correlation can be found for creative performance
and the Big Five personality trait openness (Spearman rank correlation, rho=0.4335, p=0.000)
which is also an established finding in the literature (for instance, McCrae, 1987).
4.2 Creative Productivity after Sorting
In the final creative task, subjects could choose their preferred reward scheme. According to
principal-agent-theory, the output of subjects who chose the tournament is supposed to reveal
a higher creative performance compared to the output of subjects who chose the fixed payment
for two reasons: (1) the tournament prize should trigger a positive incentive effect and (2) the
more productive agents should self-select into the tournament.
Before I will analyze whether agents sorted according to their productivity, I investigate
differences in creative output of subjects before and after sorting. By comparing average
productivity, subjects in the tournament outperformed subjects under fixed pay with a
considerable performance gap: 35.853 (s.d.=11.849) vs. 23.763 (s.d.=11.589) points, see Table
2. The subjects who opted for the tournament significantly increased their score under the
tournament compared to their creative productivity in tasks 1 and 2 (paired t-test, p<0.000 for
both comparisons). When performance is compared for the same subjects over time, one can
argue that these performance changes are due to learning effects which cannot be excluded here.
However, another study by Bradler et al. (2014) used a very similar set-up with identical items
and time frame where subjects in a control group did not show any significant learning effects in
24This is in line with empirical evidence for a crowding-in of intrinsic motivation, as for instance, provided by
Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) or Eisenberger et al. (1999). Robert Eisenberger and his co-authors argue that
crowding-out effects are more likely for performance-independent rewards as they signal that the principal rewards
average or inadequate performance. In contrast, performance-dependent rewards such as a piece rate rather foster
people’s feeling of self-determination, and thus their creative performance.
25The final grade from high school refers in Germany to the university-entrance examination (Abitur). Spearman
rank correlation of Productivity Indicator 2 and the final grade is -0.23 (p=0.011), where a grade of 1 refers to the
best and a grade of 4 refers to the worst grade which can be assigned.
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the unusual uses task. This suggests that those individuals who opted for the tournament show a
positive incentive effect under the tournament compared to the piece rate, and an even stronger
incentive effect compared to the performance under no reward. This positive incentive effect is
in contrast to studies showing crowding-out effects of extrinsic motivators in tasks which are
high in intrinsic motivation, such as creative tasks, which was controversially discussed in the
psychological literature (see, for instance, Deci et al., 1999; Amabile, 1996a; Eisenberger and
Cameron, 1996). However, the positive incentive effect is in line with Bradler et al. (2014), who
also find a strong incentive effect of a randomly assigned tournament in the unusual uses task.
Subjects who preferred the fixed payment show a creative output after sorting which is slightly,
albeit not significantly, larger than in task 1 without reward (paired t-test, p=0.14) but somewhat
lower than in task 2 under the piece rate which is marginally significant (paired t-test, p=0.09).
4.3 Sorting into the Tournament
The impact of individual creative productivity
In this section, I will investigate to what extent the difference in performance between the
tournament and the fixed payment scheme goes beyond an incentive effect and can also be
attributed to a sorting effect. Therefore, I analyze whether the subjects who were relatively
productive under the piece rate (Productivity Indicator 2) were more likely to sort into the
tournament. In total, 55 subjects chose the fixed payment in the sorting decision and 68 subjects
chose the tournament. Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative distribution of creative performance
measured by Productivity Indicator 2 for subjects who opted for the tournament and those who
opted for the fixed payment, separately. If subjects sort into the pay schemes according to their
productivity, the distribution functions should be clearly separated from each other, in the way
that the output distribution of subjects opting for the tournament should largely dominate the
output distribution of subjects who sorted into the fixed-pay scheme. In contrast, they run very
close to each other and at some points in the distribution they even cross. This evidence suggests
that no systematic productivity sorting of agents in the two payment schemes exists.
Table 2 confirms this notion in another way. The latter reports means and standard deviations
for both productivity indicators separately for subjects who later chose the tournament and
those opting for the fixed payment. On average, subjects who sorted into the tournament
achieved 27.824 (s.d.=9.638) points in Productivity Indicator 2. In comparison, subjects who
later opted for the fixed payment, scored 26.145 (s.d.=10.997) points. This difference is not
statistically significantly different by a t-test (p=0.370). The result also holds for the scores of
the Productivity Indicator 1. Here, a t-test yields a p-value of 0.507.26
26The result is also robust to a comparison test with subjects’ maximum productivity out of both productivity
indicators.
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It is also interesting how subjects sorting decisions are related to their scores in the separate
dimensions of their total score: validity, flexibility and originality. It might be the case that the
tournament attracted subjects who do not submit a high quantity of answers but a high quality in
terms of the originality of answers. Figure 3 demonstrates that the separate scores (Productivity
Indicator 2) of subjects who opted for the tournament were not significantly better than were the
scores of subjects preferring the fixed payment in all scoring dimensions (Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests, p-values are 0.18 for validity, 0.27 for flexibility and 0.43 for originality).
In step 6 of the experiment, subjects were asked for their hypothetical sorting decision for
alternative fixed payments. One should expect that the more attractive an alternative fixed
payment is, the fewer workers should prefer to select into the tournament. This is borne out
by the data. Figure 4 (bottom part) illustrates a declining fraction of subjects who prefer the
tournament when the offered fixed payment is increasing. Furthermore, the higher the offered
fixed payments, the more productive are the subjects who still prefer the tournament. However,
a Spearman rank correlation reveals that the relationship between subjects’ productivity and
the lowest fixed payment they prefer over the tournament is not significant (p=0.434). Figure
4 (upper part) shows that only in the range of low fixed payments are some small differences
in the individual productivity of subjects sorting into the tournament and subjects opting for
the fixed payment. In the higher range of fixed payments, subjects’ preferences in favor of or
against the tournament do not relate to their productivity.
In sum, the increase in creative productivity in the tournament seems to be driven only by an
incentive effect. There is no indication of a significant selection effect of the more creative
subjects into the tournament.
The impact of self-assessment and personal characteristics
As mentioned in the introduction, other potential drivers apart from creative ability may affect
agents’ self-selection. I will first present descriptive statistics on the sorting of subjects with
respect to their risk attitudes, relative self-assessments, gender, as well as other self-reported
variables and Big Five personality traits. Finally, I present results of a probit regression on
subjects’ sorting behavior which takes all relevant sorting dimensions simultaneously into
account.
The risk attitude is likely to affect the sorting decision because the two payment schemes offered
differ in the risk they involve. In the case of the tournament, subjects face an uncertain payoff
because of a large spread in potential earnings (1,300 vs. 0 Taler) and because the opponents’
performance is unknown. In contrast, in the case of the fixed payment agents always receive
400 Taler independent of their output; no risk is involved. The more risk averse subjects are,
the lower are their expected utilities from the tournament prize. Thus, it can be expected that
the more risk averse a subject is, the less likely he or she is to select into the tournament. This
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prediction is borne out by the data. In the following, I focus on the risk measure elicited in
step 10 of the experiment (the validated question from the German socio-economic panel) as
Dohmen and Falk do for their analysis.27 Subjects who opted for the tournament exhibit on
average a risk attitude of 5.91 (s.d.=2.11) while subjects choosing the fixed payment reveal an
average of 4.65 (s.d.=1.98) on an 11-point scale (where zero means “not willing to take risks at
all” and 10 means “strongly willing to take risks”). This difference is significant by a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (p=0.001). In order to compare the influence of risk preferences on the sorting
decision to the results from Dohmen and Falk (2011), I also analyzed whether subjects who
chose the tournament in the creative task exhibited a different risk tolerance than those who
favored the tournament for the math task. As mentioned in the introduction, creative tasks are
characterized by the fact that no logic algorithm or standard approach exists to generate creative
ideas. As a consequence, the absence of any significant productivity sorting might also be driven
by the fact that subjects perceive creative output as per se less predictable and more variable than
performance in a math task. If this were the case, subjects who opt for the tournament in the
creative task should reveal a higher risk tolerance compared to subjects favoring the tournament
in Dohmen and Falk (2011). This is not borne out by the data. The average willingness to take
risks of subjects who choose the tournament is 6.02 (s.d.=2.00) in Dohmen and Falk (2011) and
5.91 (s.d.=2.11) in the present study, which does not significantly differ (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p=0.917).28
Hence, the absence of a sorting pattern with respect to creative productivity cannot be explained
by a larger (perceived) risk that creative output will not correspond to perceived ability and
effort. Nevertheless, the descriptive results suggest that risk preferences significantly affect
agents’ sorting into a tournament scheme.
As explained in Section 3.2, subjects were asked for a relative self-assessment of their
performance in step 5 of the experiment. Given the creative productivity of a subject, it can
be expected that the more optimistic a subject’s relative self-assessment is, the more likely
27Like Dohmen and Falk (2011), I observe a few subjects who indicate multiple switching points in the risk
measure with lottery choices (step 9), where it is not clear how to treat those observations. Further, the lottery risk
measure might be biased by endowment effects due to previous earnings in the experiment. As described in 3.2,
I randomized half of the subjects into sessions with immediate information about tournament winners and losers
(as in the original design by Dohmen and Falk, 2011) and the other half into sessions where this information is
provided at the very end of the experiment to check whether the information on earnings affect behavior in the
lottery choices. The results indicate that this is the case. For instance, tournament participants who do not know
whether they won the tournament or not are significantly more risk tolerant in the lottery choices than subjects
who already received the information of being the winner (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.068). No such difference
can be found for the GSOEP risk measure (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.986). A similar pattern can be found for
losers. Thus, the GSOEP risk measure appears to be the more reliable indicator of risk preferences in this design.
28The share of people opting for the tournament in the present study is also similar to that in Dohmen and Falk
(2011): 55% in this study vs. 50% in Dohmen and Falk (2011). Further, the average willingness to take risks of
all subjects in the experiment does not differ significantly between Dohmen and Falk (2011) and the present study
(5.24 with a standard deviation of 2.18 in Dohmen and Falk (2011) vs. 5.35 with a standard deviation of 2.14 in
the present study, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.600).
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the subject self-selects into the tournament. This is supported by the data. Subjects who
later preferred the tournament guessed on average a rank of 5.06 (s.d.=1.53) while those
subjects who later preferred the fixed payment were more pessimistic by assuming on average
a rank of 6.09 (s.d.=1.70) among the 10 participants within their session. This difference
is statistically significant by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p=0.001). If subjects have a very
good knowledge about their own relative ability, these self-assessments should simply reflect
revealed productivity. That is, self-assessed ranks should be very highly correlated with the
Productivity Indicator 2. As Table 3 shows, the correlation is significant but with a magnitude
of -0.3541 (p=0.001) substantially weaker than in Dohmen and Falk (2011) where productivity
and self-assessments correlated with a magnitude of -0.695.29
In order to compare how subjects evaluated their own relative performance and how they truly
performed, one can look at rank beliefs and true ranks. If subjects guess their relative rank
correctly, rank belief and true rank are identical. On average, the absolute difference between
subjects’ rank belief and their true rank is 2.22 (s.d.=1.61). Figure 5 illustrates the individual
differences between rank beliefs and true ranks graphically.
The latter demonstrates substantial misjudgments of subjects. Only 16 out of 123 subjects
(13.01%) predict their rank correctly. A total of 44.72% of the subjects misjudged their rank by
indicating a worse performance rank than their true rank, thus, these subjects can be referred to
as underconfident. The remaining 42.28% indicated a better rank than they actually achieved
and can be described as overconfident. Moreover, one can look at the percentage of subjects
who misjudged their rank only by one rank position or more than this. A total of 26.83%
of the subjects misjudged their true rank by one rank position and were either underconfident
(8.94%) or overconfident with respect to their rank (17.89%). Further 35.77% of the subjects
underestimated their relative performance by more than one rank position and the remaining
24.39% estimated their relative performance too optimistically by guessing more than one
rank better than they actually achieved. This suggests that subjects had difficulties correctly
assessing how well they performed relatively to others in the creative task. The misjudgments
in self-assessments go in both directions: a similar frequency of subjects showed to be over-
or underconfident. This picture changes if self-assessments are split up by gender. Among
men 50% of all subjects are overconfident, whereas only approx. 35% of all women are
overconfident. However, self-assessments are not significantly different between men and
women (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.25).
As mentioned in the introduction, many studies have found evidence that women are less likely
to enter competitive environments (for instance, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Differences
29Please note, that the negative sign of the correlation is due to the measurement of people’s self-assessments.
People where asked to indicate their belief on the number of better performing participants. That is, the larger the
indicated number, the more pessimistic is the self-assessment.
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in competition aversion between men and women have been related to women being more risk
averse (for instance, Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Dohmen and Falk, 2011) or to the stereotype
that women are less able in specific tasks such as a math task, although this is in fact not the
case (Günther et al., 2010). No such stereotype should exist for the "unusual uses task". Female
subjects indicated an average willingness to take risks of 5.44 (s.d.=2.22) and male subjects
an average of 5.24 (s.d.=2.06) which is not statistically different (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p=0.663). And looking at the raw data, the share of men and women choosing the tournament
is very similar: 53.85% of all women and 56.9% of all men opted for the tournament. Thus, the
descriptive data do not indicate a gender effect in the sorting pattern.
After each task in the experiment, self-reported variables on perceived fun, effort, stress and
exhaustion were elicited. Table 4 presents means and standard deviations for all self-reported
variables before and after sorting by the preferred compensation scheme.30 Before sorting,
effort and exhaustion do not differ significantly between subjects preferring the tournament
and those opting for the fixed payment. In contrast, Table 4 shows that subjects who sort into
the tournament indicated a significantly higher level of perceived fun and a significantly lower
level of stress in the previous task than did subjects who sorted into the fixed payment.31 This
does not suggest that highly intrinsically motivated subjects anticipated a detrimental effect of
the tournament on performance. Based on a comprehensive literature (for instance, Amabile,
1996a), fun as a proxy for intrinsic motivation can be assumed to be positively related to creative
performance. In contrast, stress has been found to be negatively related to creative performance
(for instance, Avey et al., 2012). Spearman rank correlation coefficients in Table 3 confirm
that the perceived level of fun is positively and stress is negatively related to the Productivity
Indicator 2. However, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients are not large enough to
mediate a significant relationship of creative performance and sorting into the tournament
(Spearman rank correlation of Productivity Indicator 2 with fun: rho= 0.3445, p<0.001; and
with stress: rho=0.157, p=0.083).
Interestingly, women experience significantly more fun and exhaustion than men at the creative
task (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p=0.002 for fun, and p=0.03 for exhaustion). Finally, neither
the Big Five Personality traits nor the Work Preference Inventory (WPI) for general extrinsic
and intrinsic motivation (Amabile et al., 1994) showed a significant difference between subjects
opting for the tournament and those opting for the fixed payment (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for
Big Five, p>0.15 for all traits, and p>0.36 for the WPI scales).
30In the following, I will focus on self-reported measures for performance under the monetary incentive of
the piece rate (step 4) as this seems most informative for the selection into a tournament for a monetary prize.
However, results are very similar for self-reported measures which were elicited after the first creative task where
performance was not rewarded (step 2).
31The same is true for mean comparison tests of self-reports elicited in step 2: subjects who later choose the
fixed payment indicated significantly less fun (p=0.007) and significantly more stress (p=0.074) than did subjects
who chose the tournament.
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Joint analysis of multidimensional sorting
In the following, I will present a multivariate regression which takes all important sorting
dimensions simultaneously into account, and analyzes their relative importance for the sorting
decision. A probit model is estimated where the dependent variable takes the value one if a
subject selected into the tournament, and zero otherwise. The reported coefficients are marginal
effects estimated at the mean. They can be interpreted as the change in the probability that a
subject opts for the tournament when the respective variable increases by one unit at the mean.
Table 5 reports the results. Column II adds the self-reported measures fun, stress, effort and
exhaustion (elicited in step 5). Columns III and IV add control variables such as age, income,
the Big Five personality measures and a dummy for subjects whose field of study is economics.
For the interpretation of the results, I will mainly refer to the most comprehensive specification
in column IV. The first important result that the analysis reveals is that individuals’ creative
ability, as measured by the Productivity Indicator 2 does not explain sorting behavior. This
further strengthens the result from the previously presented descriptive statistics.32 Again in
line with the descriptive statistics, regression results demonstrate that instead of ability, risk
preferences and relative self-assessments explain a large share of the sorting pattern. If a subject
indicates a risk tolerance which is one point higher then the average indicated willingness to take
risks on an eleven-point scale the likelihood increases by 7.6 percentage points that this subject
opts for the tournament. The magnitude of the coefficient for risk attitude is similar but slightly
lower than in the analysis of Dohmen and Falk (2011) who find an increase in the likelihood to
choose the tournament of 8.7 percentage points for a one unit increase of the willingness to take
risks at the mean. A subject’s perception of the number of better performing participants within
the session is significantly negatively related to the choice for the tournament. That is, the lower
the value of the relative self-assessment, the higher is the rank a subject believes to have among
the total of 10 participants within a session. Subjects with a more optimistic self-assessment of
one rank below the mean are by 8.4 percentage points more likely to enter the tournament (and
vice versa for pessimistic subjects). The magnitude of the coefficient is substantially larger than
in Dohmen and Falk (2011), who find an increase of 2.7 percentage points. This indicates that
subjects do strongly rely on their self-assessments when facing the sorting decision.
Self-reports on perceived fun, effort and stress after performing under the piece rate (step 5)
did also affect the likelihood of entering the tournament. It turns out that perceived fun as well
as subjects’ indicated effort level (on a seven-point Likert scale) show a strong positive effect
on the likelihood to enter the tournament. In contrast, perceived stress is strongly negatively
related to subjects choice to opt for the tournament.
32Robustness tests with Productivity Indicator 1 or specifications with different subsets of the independent
variables show very similar results.
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Finally, I would like to look at whether sorting is affected by gender. As shown earlier with the
raw data, the fraction of men and women entering the tournament was very similar. In columns
I and III, where individual productivity, relative self-assessments and gender are jointly taken
into account, no significant effect of women for the entry into the tournament emerges. Before
concluding that sorting is not affected by gender, I turn again to Table 3, which that females
report significantly higher level of fun and exhaustion in the creative task.33 Because fun turned
out to be a significant positive predictor of favoring the tournament, it might be the case that
a potential gender effect is confounded by this variable. Columns II and IV report regression
results where individuals perceived level of fun, effort, stress and exhaustion are additionally
included as explanatory variables. Controlling for perceived fun, it turns out that women are
less likely to enter the tournament. This is in line with prior evidence that women are averse to
competition which goes beyond mere risk aversion (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
5 Supplementary Analysis with Representative Field Data
5.1 Data and Design
A legitimate question is whether the experimental results can be generalized to real labor
market settings. An attractive approach which was exploited by Dohmen and Falk (2011) is
a complementary analysis of a large field data set as an external robustness check. This may not
offer the possibility of excluding potential biases due to unobserved heterogeneity or reverse
causality. But if similar sorting patterns emerge in real-world data, the complementarity of
the results suggests that the systematic pattern which was found in the lab also transfers to
real world labor market. In order to test for the external validity of my results, I conduct
a complementary analysis with a representative field data set from Germany which allows a
comparison of sorting into performance pay between creative and non-creative jobs.
Like Dohmen and Falk (2011), I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
which is a representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany. The survey
targets all household members who are more than 17 years old, and most of the interviews are
conducted either face-to-face or via a personal phone interview.34 Respondents are surveyed
according to a wide range of topics, including their current employment status, education, and
various personal characteristics. In selected years, the questionnaire included a question on
whether job performance is regularly assessed by a superior in a formal procedure. Dohmen
33In Table 3 correlations are presented for the self-reported measures of fun, effort, stress and exhaustion with
respect to the second creative task (step 4). However, correlations reveal a very similar picture if self-reports after
the first creative tasks (step 2) are used, where subjects were not rewarded.
34For further information on the GSOEP data, see http://www.diw.de/en/soep.
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and Falk (2011) use this information as a rough indicator for variable pay and estimate how
productivity, risk attitudes, social preferences and gender affect the probability of working under
variable pay.35 As proxy variables for productivity, they use individuals’ years of schooling,
experience on the labor market and tenure. The picture which emerges is very similar to the
laboratory results. They find that more productive and risk tolerant workers are more likely
to work for performance pay while women are less likely to work under variable payment
schemes. They conclude that these findings are consistent with the observed sorting behavior
in their experiment.36
In the following, I present results from an analysis of the GSOEP data to check whether
sorting into performance pay differs between creative and non-creative jobs and whether my
experimental results can be found in a similar manner in the GSOEP data. The present analysis
extends the evidence on sorting into performance pay provided by Dohmen and Falk (2011) in
several respects: the analysis is extended with data from further waves, different variations of
the dependent variable are presented, and most importantly, a comparison between creative and
non-creative jobs is added. As self-assessments of creative performance are not available in the
GSOEP, the analysis focuses on the impact of creative ability on sorting into performance pay,
and further takes other relevant sorting dimensions such as additional productivity indicators,
risk attitude, gender, and other firm characteristics and occupational categories into account.
A crucial requirement for the analysis is the definition of creative jobs. Therefore, an established
classification suggested by Richard Florida (2004, 2006) is adopted. Similar to the concept of
creativity applied in the experiment, Florida‘s notion of the creative class corresponds to a
relatively broad definition. He states that the distinguishing characteristic of the creative class is
that its members “engage in work whose function is to create meaningful new forms” (Florida,
2002, p. 68). Florida distinguishes those who fully engage in the creative process and whose
primary job function is to be creative and innovative as the creative core. An important subgroup
of the creative core comprise the Bohemians, who are artistically creative people such as writers,
painters, designers, photographers, journalists, dancers, composers, actors and musicians. Apart
from this small subgroup, the creative core comprises a wide range of occupations in the fields of
science, engineering, education, computer programming and research.37 According to Florida,
the members of the creative core are those who mainly engage in creating something new: ideas,
35About 80% of respondents report that performance evaluations affect their monthly gross wage, a yearly bonus,
future salary increases and/or potential promotions. The question on risk preferences is explained in Section 3.2
because the identical question was used in step 11 of the experiment to elicit subjects risk preferences.
36Grund and Sliwka (2010) conducted a related study with GSOEP data and showed similar results.
37Beyond the creative core, Florida (2004) defines a group of creative professionals: a diverse group of
professionals who “engage in creative problem-solving, drawing on complex bodies of knowledge to solve specific
problems.” and are required to regularly think on their own. The creative professionals include all kind of senior
officials and managers, health professionals such as nurses, finance or sales professionals. The share of core
creative activities such as idea generation can, however, be seen as relatively small in these occupations. That is
why I restrict my analysis to the Bohemians and the creative core.
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knowledge, technology, designs and/or content. Divergent thinking is required here in a similar
way as it is the case in the unusual uses task. An overview of all of the occupations that I include
in the creative class can be found in Table 6.
In contrast to Dohmen and Falk (2011), who use the 2004 wave, I extend the empirical
analysis of the GSOEP to the waves 2008 and 2011 where the relevant variables have also
been elicited. 38 Over the time span from 2004 to 2011, both sectors show an substantial
increase in the number of employees with pay for performance. In creative jobs, the number
of workers who indicated to be regularly evaluated according to their performance increased
from 35% to 52%, and in non-creative jobs it shows a rise from 28% to 37%. In the GSOEP
subjects were further asked whether this performance evaluation has some monetary impact,
by affecting their monthly gross wage, a yearly bonus, future salary increases and/or potential
promotions. In both sectors, on average approximately 80% of respondents indicated that they
experience at least one of these monetary impacts. The portion of respondents that experience
direct monetary consequences, such as an impact on monthly gross wages or a yearly bonus,
increased from 15% to 26% for the creative class and from 14% to 20% for the non-creative
class. Hence, although performance evaluations are more common for the creative class, the
relative frequency of performance pay in terms of direct monetary consequences on monthly
income or yearly bonuses is very similar in both sectors.
Given its broad application, not much is known about the extent to which performance pay does
not only serve as a tool to motivate workers but also attracts the most creative talents in jobs
which require creative output. As a proxy for creative productivity, I use two indicators: the
years of schooling as an indicator of intelligence and the Big Five personality trait openness.
An extensive research has shown that creativity is strongly related to intelligence (Eysenck,
1995; Batey and Furnham, 2006). Thus, years of schooling, as a rough proxy for intelligence,
should be not only related to an individual’s general productivity but also to an individuals’
capacity to be creative. Yet, empirical evidence indicated that the relation is not linear and
gets weaker for IQ’s greater than 120 (see Batey and Furnham, 2006, and references therein).
As a large share of employees in the creative class is highly educated, the years of schooling
might not serve as a good predictor for these individuals.39 That is why I use the Big Five
personality trait "Openness to experience” as an additional indicator for creative productivity.
The Big Five model is an established concept of describing human personality with five factors:
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism (Costa and McCrae,
1992). The importance of personality traits for creative outcomes has received much attention
38The three waves are merged for a cross-sectional analysis. If an individual is observed in more than one year,
the most recent observation is used.
39Employees in the creative sector have a larger mean of the years of schooling than employees in the
non-creative sector. However, the variance of the years of schooling does not differ between the creative and
non-creative class (variance comparison test, p>0.75).
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by modern creativity research, and the personality trait openness has revealed the strongest
and most robust relation to various dimensions of creativity, including divergent thinking.40
Openness to experience describes a cognitive style which distinguishes individuals who are
imaginative, curious, amenable to new ideas, experiences and unconventional perspectives from
those who prefer the conventional, routine, and familiar (Costa and McCrae, 1992). For the
measure “Openness to experience”, participants in the GSOEP have been asked to indicate on
short scales whether they have a broad imagination, like to contribute their own ideas, and
appreciates artistic or esthetic experiences.41 Employees with a higher score in openness have
been observed to score higher in creativity tests (McCrae, 1987 and references therein), are more
likely to show a positive suggestion making behavior (Lipponen et al., 2008), and receive higher
ratings for creativity from their managers (Scratchley and Hakstian, 2001). A natural reason for
this relationship might be that relatively open workers gained more experience with the merits
of using new ways to tackle things, and hence, are also more likely to possess the potential for
improving and changing the status quo in organizational settings (George and Zhou, 2001).
In order to check reliability of openness as a measure for creative productivity, I analyze
whether the openness score predicts if someone is observed in a creative or non-creative job.
I hypothesize that individuals with high scores in openness are more likely to be observed
in a creative job. Comparing the scores for openness between the creative and non-creative
class yields a significant difference (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.000) confirming that people
working in a creative job reveal a higher score in openness than those working in a non-creative
job. As this relationship might be driven by other confounders, I run a probit analysis on
sorting in creative jobs by controlling for further socio-economic characteristics. Table 7 reveals
how the probability to observe an individual in the creative class is predicted by standardized
measures of the Big Five personality traits, risk attitude, years of schooling, age, gender and
whether the occupation of the subject’s father belongs to the creative sector.
The Big Five openness measure turns out to be a significant predictor of observing someone
in a creative job and supports the notion that individuals with relatively high potential to be
creative are also more likely to self-select into the creative sector. An openness score which is
one standard deviation larger than the mean makes an individual approximately 3 percentage
points more likely to work in the creative class.42 As mentioned earlier, many workers in the
40Previous evidence also indicates that there exists negative correlations between creative behavior and both
conscientiousness and agreeableness, and mostly positive ones for extraversion and neuroticism (Feist, 1998).
However, these relationships were observed to be less robust and varied between different dimensions of creativity
and different samples.
41It might be a concern that personality traits, such as openness, could be endogenous, i.e., it is not only the case
that more open people are more likely to sort into the creative sector, but also that working in the creative sector
makes people more open. However, evidence by McCrae and Costa (2003) and Soldz and Vaillant (1999) suggests
that personality is largely uninfluenced by the environment and remains highly stable over the lifetime.
42The Big Five traits conscientiousness and extraversion also show a significant, but negative, relation to the
probability of working in the creative class. The link between these two dimensions and creativity have been
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creative sector are highly educated, which is confirmed by the significant impact of the years of
schooling. Further, there is a positive relation with age while risk aversion and female gender
negatively affects the likelihood of being observed in a creative job.
5.2 Results
In the following, I present probit models to assess the effect of the creative productivity
indicators, risk preferences, gender, and further job and occupational characteristics on the
sorting into a job with performance evaluation and performance pay, respectively. According
to the experimental results, I expect that years of schooling and the Big Five trait openness
will not significantly affect the likelihood that people sort into creative jobs with performance
evaluation (pay). In contrast, sorting in the non-creative sector is expected to be positively
driven by the years of schooling, as in Dohmen and Falk (2011). Based on previous findings
in the literature, I expect that working in a job with performance evaluation (pay) is negatively
related to risk aversion and female gender in both sectors. Further, I include experience on
the labor market as well as tenure as further productivity indicators in all regressions. First,
the likelihood of being affected by performance evaluation (pay) increases in the hierarchical
level of an employee which usually requires a certain level of experience or tenure. Second,
experience and tenure also increase the expertise and knowledge an employee can be assumed
to possess. Expertise has been argued to be an important component for creative output.
For instance, expertise can facilitate to imagine or think about complex scientific problems
(Amabile, 1996b). Thus, experience and tenure are also expected to be positively related to
sorting into jobs with performance evaluation (pay), in creative as well as in non-creative jobs.
Table 8 reports marginal effects. In Columns I and IV, the dependent variable “Performance
evaluation” takes the value one if the survey respondent indicated being regularly assessed
according to performance. In Columns II, III, V and VI, the dependent variable “Performance
pay” defines a subgroup of the latter, taking the value one if the respondent indicated being
subject to a regular performance evaluation which directly affects her or his gross wage and/or
yearly bonus.43
For a better illustration of the results, Table 8 reports separate regressions for the creative and
non-creative class. A pooled regression with interactions terms for the creative class is not
reported here, but shows qualitatively similar results.
First, I consider results for the non-creative sector. Consistent with Dohmen and Falk’s
controversially discussed and previous results differ largely depending on the type of the creative task. Therefore,
I will focus on openness as the most robust indicator for creative behavior (Feist, 1998; Shalley et al., 2004).
43An alternative specification of the dependent variable includes potential long-term salary increases or
promotions as “performance pay”. Robustness checks reveal that this alternative variable yields qualitatively
similar results.
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(2011) previous findings, I also find that the probability of working in a job with regular
performance assessment increases significantly with productivity, measured by the years of
schooling, experience, and tenure. For instance, one year of schooling raises the probability
by 3 percentage points (Column I). Also, risk tolerance positively affects the sorting into
jobs with performance evaluation while females are less likely to be observed in such jobs.
Additionally, my results indicate that jobs with regular performance evaluation seem to attract
people who are relatively less conscientious and more extroverted. If the estimation is restricted
to people with performance pay (columns V and VI), coefficients get slightly smaller but
stay qualitatively similar. Column VI adds controls for firm size, industry, and occupation
dummies. The latter distinguishes between job types (for instance, blue vs. white collar
workers) and qualification levels. Dummies range from untrained worker to master craftsmen
for blue collar workers and from employee without training/education certificate to employee
with managerial responsibilities for white collar workers. Control variables for the public sector
and East Germany are also added. Of course, dummies for occupational categories capture a
lot of heterogeneity in productivity, that is why coefficients become smaller in size. But the
significant impact of all productivity indicators, risk attitude, gender as well as the Big Five
trait conscientiousness on sorting remains robust to the inclusion of these controls.
Now I would like to focus on the analysis for the creative class shown in the right columns
of Table 8. Here, the years of schooling do not have a significant impact, neither on sorting
into a job with performance evaluation nor performance pay. Similarly, the Big Five trait
openness has no significant influence on the probability of sorting into a job with performance
evaluation and even appears to decrease the likelihood of sorting into performance pay within
the creative class. However, the negative relation is not robust to the inclusion of further control
variables. These findings support the notion that individuals do not sort into performance pay
according to creative ability in jobs or tasks which require creative performance. Experience
shows a significant positive impact which is robust to additional controls and emerges for both,
sorting into performance evaluation as well as performance pay. For instance, for a worker who
has one year more experience above the mean, the probability of working under performance
pay increases by 2 percentage points. Tenure only explains a small share of sorting into jobs
with performance evaluation whereas the probability of working under performance pay is not
affected. In comparison to the non-creative sector, where women are 2.6 percentage points less
likely than men to work in a job with regular performance evaluation, the effect is even stronger
in the creative sector, where the probability is on average 6.5 percentage points lower for women
than for men.
In contrast to the experimental evidence and the findings for the non-creative sector, risk attitude
seems to play a minor role for sorting in performance pay within creative jobs. Although
coefficient estimates for risk attitude have a similar magnitude for the creative as well as the
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non-creative class, the effect is only weakly statistically significant in one of the specifications
for the creative class. Finally, I included a measure for reciprocity. In line with Dohmen and
Falk (2011), I find a significant impact of reciprocity on sorting into jobs with performance
pay for the non-creative sector. However, this relationship is not found for the creative sector.
These findings might also be related to the fact that sorting, in practice, has various dimensions
which cannot completely be observed in the data. Other preferences such as a strong interest in
working in a particular occupation might outweigh others, such as risk attitude or reciprocity.
As preferences for certain tasks or jobs are typically not observed in empirical data, it might be
an interesting extension for future experimental investigations to focus not only on self-selection
into a certain compensation scheme but also into particular task types. As another important
extension (Bernard et al., 2014) show that sorting also depends on the availability of alternative
contract types. Clearly, in practice, it is usually not a binary choice between, for instance, a
fixed pay contract and a tournament based variable pay contract. Other contract types such
as piece rate based pay schemes or team-based pay contracts may also be available and affect
people’s choices.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on how agents self-select into a tournament-based compensation
vs. a fixed payment scheme in a task which requires creativity.
The results of the experiment reveal that a tournament-based compensation scheme did not
attract the most productive agents in terms of creative productivity. In contrast, it attracted
agents with higher risk tolerance, higher levels of fun at the task, and more optimistic beliefs
about their own rank in the performance distribution. The absence of a significant sorting of
the more productive agents into the tournament can be attributed to misjudgments in agents’
self-assessments on their relative creative performance. The relative self-assessments of many
agents show substantial biases, either in terms of overconfidence or underconfidence. In the
psychological literature, different mechanisms are known which bias people’s self-assessments.
Many of these seem to be particularly relevant for creative tasks, such as the lack of well-defined
procedures to generate creative output or the dependence on subjective evaluations which
hamper the acquisition of knowledge on one’s relative performance (Dunning et al., 2004).
A complementary analysis with a large German survey data set provides additional support
to the experimental findings. Here, the Big Five personality trait openness as an established
proxy variable for creativity did not predict a positive selection of the more open people into
performance pay.
However, I find a large incentive effect of the tournament which is in line with previous evidence
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by Bradler et al. (2014) but contradicts predictions from crowding-out theories on the impact of
monetary rewards on performance in tasks which are high in intrinsic motivation (Deci et al.,
1999). Related to this, the analysis of the data shows no indication that highly intrinsically
motivated agents anticipate a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation. In contrast, highly
intrinsically motivated agents were even significantly more likely to opt for the tournament.
Although intrinsic motivation shows a positive correlation with creative performance, it was not
large enough to also mediate a significant relationship of creative performance and the selection
into the tournament. According to the results, tournament prizes seem to serve as a powerful
tool to foster employee performance in creative tasks, but they do not necessarily attract the
most creative types.
This result has important implications for the design of incentive contracts and recruiting
procedures by organizations. The experimental results have shown that the variable incentive
scheme attracted self-confident and risk tolerant agents as well as agents who enjoy performing
on the task. If self-confidence, risk tolerance, or pleasure on the job are important attributes for
a firm, a variable pay scheme may serve as a screening device. Overoptimism and risk tolerance
can be desirable, for instance, to foster aggressive R&D policies (Englmaier, 2010).
However, if a firms cares about attracting people with a great creative potential rather
than overconfident agents, careful screening procedures seem to be indispensable, especially
in creative jobs. The results may also explain why many organizations in creative and
knowledge-intense sectors do not rely on highly incentivized performance pay, such as
tournament-based compensation, as a screening device to recruit new talents. In fact,
organizations which rely on employees’ creativity make use of comprehensive and expensive
procedures to identify their preferred candidates. Sophisticated recruiting tools, such as
assessment centers, are mostly observed in knowledge-intense professions which constitute
a large share of the creative sector, while these screening procedures are less common for
professions with simple routine tasks. Assessment centers often select applicants not only with
respect to their expertise in a particular field as well as to their social skills, but also according
to their creative ability to deal with unusual problems and to improve, for instance, existing
products and procedures. Moreover, at art schools, for instance, the unusual uses task is a
common component of test procedures used to select eligible candidates. Attracting employees
who do not fit to the organization in terms of personal capabilities and characteristics can lead to
higher employee turnover, creating additional costs related to recruiting, training, uncertainties
in planning, and other processing costs.
Finally, the multi-componential approach of modern creativity research argues that creativity
emerges from a complex interaction of individuals’ personality traits, their extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation, and environmental factors (Amabile, 1996a). Thus, firms that rely on
30
knowledge-intense and creative output, such as Google or Yahoo44, create an inspiring work
environment or offer flexible work conditions in order to attract and to motivate talents. These
factors can also be thought of as additional sorting dimension individuals might increasingly
care about in the future.
The extent to which the likelihood of over- and underestimation of own relative ability improves
when employees gain experience on their job and receive repetitive feedback on their relative
performance remains an open question for future research. Accurate feedback may enable
employees to better assess their relative capabilities and may encourage an efficient sorting
of the most capable into performance pay contracts, or more specifically, into tournaments for
promotions within a firm. However, as Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued, basic judgmental
biases are unlikely to correct themselves over time. Several reasons have been discussed for
the persistence of misjudgments. First, accurate and immediate feedback is rarely available
in practice because it is often not easy to attribute outcomes to a particular action or person.
Second, the environments and other influential factors often change rapidly and it is difficult
to know what the outcome would have been in a different setting. And finally, if feedback
is highly subjective, then individuals tend to neglect important information (see, for instance,
Dunning et al., 2004). Empirical support for the permanence of biases has been shown by
Moore and Cain (2007), where the provision of absolute and relative performance feedback
did not reduce biases in relative self-assessments. Even if misjudgments partly correct over
time with increasing experience and reliable feedback, wrong self-assessments on own relative
ability should be taken into account particularly for young professionals in the creative class
when designing incentive schemes to attract creative talents.
44For instance, James B. Stewart, columnist at the New York Times, reported on Google’s philosophy to create
an inspiring work environment by providing open kitchens and free-food areas, and by encouraging employees to
scribble on walls and to design their own desks like a playground. The article was downloaded on May, 12th via
the following link: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/business/at-google-a-place-to-work-and-play.html.
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Appendix
Table 1: Examples for Answers and Categories for the Unusual Uses Task by Item
Paper Tin can Cord
Frequent Paper airplane Pen container Shoestrings
Answers Paper hat Tin can phone Dog leash
Toilet paper Ball Fishing line
Frequent Toys Non-food Container Fixation (Clothing)
Categories Clothing Communication Leashes
Hygiene/Cleaning Sport devices Fishing
Original Lampshade Bedstead Pulley block
Answers Filter Animal house Rope bridge
Playing cards Insect trap Bowstring
Very original Sound amplifier Scarecrow Trap (to play a trick)
Answers Wind wheel Shower head Straightening of acreages
Artificial snow (for decoration) Treasure chest To cut a cake
Invalid Pencil Computer Glasses
Answers Television Window Electric conductor
Surfboard Shoes Rope for bungee jumping
Table 2: Creative Productivity before and after Sorting by Preferred Reward Scheme
Fixed payment Tournament T-test
Mean Mean p-value
(sd) (sd)
Productivity Indicator 1 21.891 23.118 0.507
(No reward) (10.621) (9.758)
Productivity Indicator 2 26.145 27.824 0.370
(Piece rate) (10.997) (9.638)
Productivity in Main Task 23.763 35.853 0.000***
(Preferred scheme) (11.589) (11.849)
Observations 55 68
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Figure 1: Design of the Experiment
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Figure 2: Productivity of Subjects before Sorting by Preferred Compensation Scheme
Figure 3: Productivity before Sorting (Productivity Indicator 2) by Score Dimension and
Preferred Scheme
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Figure 4: Hypothetical Choices on Sorting by Alternative Fixed Payments
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Figure 5: Subjects Rank Beliefs and True Ranks
Note: The size of the spots increase with the observations they contain.
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Table 5: Determinants of Sorting in the Tournament (vs. the Fixed Payment Scheme)
Dependent variable 1 if tournament
I II III IV
Creative -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.006
productivity (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Risk attitude 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.076***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026)
Relative -0.108*** -0.086*** -0.104*** -0.084***
self-assessment (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Female -0.003 -0.077* -0.033 -0.117**
(0.062) (0.044) (0.037) (0.049)
Fun 0.089*** 0.098***
(0.034) (0.030)
Effort 0.098** 0.110***
(0.047) (0.040)
Stress -0.112*** -0.124***
(0.034) (0.038)
Exhaustion 0.036 0.031
(0.029) (0.028)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 123 123 123 123
Sessions 13 13 13 13
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.218 0.156 0.238
Note: Probit estimates. Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) are reported. Robust
standard errors clustered for sessions are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is one, if the subject
chooses the tournament, and zero if the subject chooses the fixed wage. Creative productivity is measured by
Productivity Indicator 2 where subjects worked on the unusual task under the piece rate incentive. The variable
relative self-assessment indicates subjects’ belief on the number of better performing participants in the second
creative task. That is, the smaller the value of the relative self-assessment, the more productive a subject thinks he
or she is relative to others within the session. Self-reported measures on fun, effort, stress and exhaustion refer to
the performance under the piece rate before sorting (elicited in step 5 of the experiment). Controls include the Big
Five personality measures, age, income and whether a subject has an economic field of study. Asterisks next to
coefficients indicate a significance level as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 6: Definition of the Creative Class according to ISCO-88 Occupation Codes
Groups of creative people Occupations and ISCO-88 codes
Creative Core & Physicists, Chemists, and related professionals (211)
creative handicraft professions Mathematicians, statisticians and related professionals (212)
Computing professionals (213)
Architects, engineers and related professionals (214)
Life science professionals (221)
Scientific teaching professionals (231-235)
Information professionals (243)
Social sciences and related professionals (244)
Scientific ministerial officers and administrative professionals (247)
Musical instrument makers (7312)
Jewelery and precious-metal workers (7313)
Glass, ceramics and related decorative painters (7324)
Handicraft workers in wood, textile, leather and
related materials (7331,7332)
Tailors, dressmakers and hatters (7433)
Bohemians Writers and creative performing artists (245)
Photographers and image and sound recording
equipment operators (3131)
Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals (347)
Note: The definition of the creative class is aligned to Florida (2002) and has been transferred to ISCO-88
occupation codes in a similar way, for instance, by Boschma and Fritsch (2009) or Cruz and Teixeira (2012).
Information on the current International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) can be found on
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/intro.htm.
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Table 7: Sorting into the Creative Class in the German Socio-Economic Panel
Dependent variable 1 if Creative class
Conscientiousness -0.017***
(std.) [0.004]
Extraversion -0.011***
(std.) [0.004]
Agreeableness -0.001
(std.) [0.004]
Openness to 0.025***
experience (std.) [0.004]
Neuroticism -0.004
(std.) [0.004]
Risk attitude -0.005***
[0.002]
Years of schooling 0.049***
[0.001]
Age (in years) 0.003***
[0.000]
Female -0.034***
[0.008]
Father in the 0.006
creative class [0.008]
Observations 7,320
Pseudo R-squared 0.291
Note: Probit estimates. Marginal effects at the mean reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. The sample
consists of merged cross-sectional data from the GSOEP waves 2004, 2008 and 2011. If respondents are observed
in more than one of these years, the most recent observation is used. The Big Five have been elicited in the 2005
and 2009 wave of the GSOEP. For the analysis in this paper, I primarily use the information from 2005. If a person
was not observed in 2005, I add the information on the Big Five measures of the respective person from the 2009
wave, if available. Asterisks next to coefficients indicate a significance level as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 8: Sorting into Performance Pay in the German Socio-Economic Panel
Non-Creative Class Creative Class
Dependent Variable Performance Performance Pay Performance Performance Pay
Evaluation Evaluation
I II III IV V VI
Years of Schooling 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.000 -0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Openness 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.019 -0.024** -0.010
(std.) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Experience full-time 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.013** 0.019*** 0.014***
(in years) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience full-time -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.015**
squared (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Experience part-time 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.012**
(in years) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Experience part-time -0.007 0.007 -0.006 -0.029 -0.017 -0.042
squared (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029)
Tenure 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.001* 0.005*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (in years) -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Risk attitude 0.006** 0.004** 0.005*** -0.004 0.009* 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Female -0.026** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.065** -0.110*** -0.042*
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.022) (0.024)
Other Big Five traits
Conscientiousness -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.008* -0.006 0.001 0.014
(std.) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Extraversion 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.015 -0.007 -0.011
(std.) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Agreeableness -0.006 -0.009** -0.006 -0.008 -0.013 -0.007
(std.) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Neuroticism 0.001 -0.011*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 0.009
(std.) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Reciprocity -0.010** -0.021
(0.004) (0.013)
Public Sector -0.019* -0.132***
(0.011) (0.033)
East Germany -0.011 0.000
(0.009) (0.023)
Firm size dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Occupation dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 9638 9459 8112 1751 1709 1435
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.063 0.171 0.023 0.063 0.214
Note: Probit estimates. Marginal effects at the mean reported. The sample consists of merged cross-sectional data
from the GSOEP waves 2004, 2008 and 2011. If respondents are observed in more than one of these years, the
most recent observation is used. The Big Five have been elicited in the 2005 and 2009 wave of the GSOEP. For the
analysis in this paper, I primarily use the information from 2005. If a person was not observed in 2005, I add the
information on the Big Five measures of the respective person from the 2009 wave, if available. The reciprocity
measure is also taken from the 2005 wave. Asterisks next to coefficients indicate a significance level as follows:
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
49
